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Abstract   
This paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment in the UK 
using panel data based on balance-sheets of publicly listed non-financial companies 
supplied by Worldscope for the period 1985-2013. We find robust evidence of an 
adverse effect of not only financial payments (interests and dividends) but also 
financial incomes on the rate of accumulation. The negative impacts of financial 
incomes from interests and dividends are particularly strong for the pre-crisis period. 
Our findings support the ‘financialization thesis’ that the increasing orientation of the 
non-financial sector towards financial activities is ultimately leading to lower physical 
investment, hence to stagnant or fragile growth, as well as long term concerns for 
productivity.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment in the UK 
using panel data based on balance-sheets of non-financial publicly listed companies 
for the period of 1985-2013. We aim at contributing to the understanding of the 
impact of two institutional changes, which emerged in the last decades in developed 
capitalist economies: a) a new regime of accumulation largely shaped around 
financial motives and b) the consolidation of the ‘shareholder value’ as the key 
principle in corporate governance1. The USA and the UK have been at the forefront of 
these changes (Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013)2. This paper aims at presenting a 
theoretical model and an empirical analysis of the effects of financialization on firms’ 
investment in fixed assets in the case of the UK. 
Back in the 1950s Joan Robinson (1952:86) stated that "where enterprise leads 
finance follows", describing a financial system that was merely supporting 
trajectories already planned by the productive sector. In contrast, recent structural 
changes in the functioning of capitalism mark the growing prominence of the 
‘financial motives’ over the traditional productive purposes. In this sense, the picture 
for the UK economy, along with other developed capitalist economies, is emblematic. 
In the 1970s, the share of manufacturing in value added was equal to 31% whilst the 
financial activities (Financial Intermediation and Real Estate -FIRE) counted for only 
13%, as shown in Figure 1. Since 1991 the share of FIRE has surpassed 
manufacturing, and as of 2013 the financial sector represents 31.2% of the total value 
added, whilst that of manufacturing dropped to 9.8%.  Instead of being merely a 
vehicle for more efficient production plans, in the last decades the financial activities 
have grown disproportionately compared to the financing requirements of the rest of 
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the economy. This new configuration raises the question of how this imbalance 
affected the accumulation processes in the non-financial sector.  
[Figure 1] 
 
This tendency could be interpreted as the result of the growth of the UK (and 
especially London) as an international financial centre specialized in providing 
unique financial services to the global economic system. In this view, this potentially 
positive structural change would have benefited all the other economic setors. In fact, 
the mainstream literature asserts that financial markets facilitate the financing and 
the efficient allocation of investment (King and Levine, 1993; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995; Beck et al., 2000; Love, 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004; Levine, 
2005). However, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) warn against the robustness of 
these results based on cross-country evidence, which do not take into account the 
institutional peculiarities. Moreover, the effect of stock market development on 
growth is found to be weaker than that of the banking sector (Arestis et al., 2001). 
Recently after the 2007-2008 crash, the disproportionate growth of the financial 
system has been questioned in some mainstream contributions as well (Cecchetti and 
Kharroubi, 2012; Beck et al., 2014). In particular, Law and Singh (2014) argue that 
there is a ‘threshold effect’ in the relationship between the extension of financial 
resources and growth; thus the expansion of the financial system is beneficial to 
growth only up to a point. Recently, a similar argument has been put forward by an 
IMF discussion note with respect to emerging markets (Sahay et al., 2015), which 
argues that ‘too much finance’ increases both economic and financial volatility. 
 The Post-Keynesian literature on ‘financialization’ illustrates the negative 
impacts of expanding financial sector on the economic systems (Epstein, 2005), on 
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income distribution and demand (Onaran et al., 2010; Hein, 2013), and in particular 
on investment (Stockhammer, 2004, 2006; Orhagnazi, 2008a; Dallery, 2009; 
Cordonnier and Van de Velde, 2015).  ‘Financialization’ is a self-reinforcing socio-
economic process, which manifests itself in the growing prominence of behaviours 
derived from the functioning of the financial sector. A similar argument can be found 
in the marxist literature, for which the long-term trajectories of the economies 
gravitate more around the financial sector and less around the productive one 
(Foster, 2010). Since the 1980s, the slow down in investment and growth went along 
with a rise in the interest and dividend payments and share buybacks of the non-
financial corporations (NFCs), which ‘punctured’ the value generated by NFCs 
(Duménil and Levy, 2004). As a consequence, companies experienced a significant 
reduction in available funds for physical investments.3 
Despite an expanding theoretical literature on the effects of financialization, 
the empirical evidence is predominantly relegated to a macro perspective, especially 
in the case of physical investment. The origins of the theoretical microeconomic 
approach to the impact of finance on investment can be traced back to the seminal 
works of Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999). To the best of our 
knowledge only Orhangazi (2008b) and Demir (2009) analyse directly the effects of 
financialization on accumulation from a microeconomic perspective.  
The novelty of this paper is, firstly, to provide a model of firm-level 
investment, which extends the Post-Keynesian model by Fazzari and Mott (1986) by 
integrating the effects of financial incomes as well as payments in a coherent fashion. 
Second, we use the Worldscope database for firm balance sheets, which allows us to 
build a consistent measure for companies’ financial activities regarding both inflows 
and outflows. Third, we provide the first micro-econometric evidence for the UK on 
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the effects of financialization on investment using firm data, which is an important 
but under-researched case. Finally, we compare the explanatory power of the Post-
Keynesian model to the mainstream Tobin’s Q model. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the key 
theoretical and empirical contributions in the literature. Section 3 presents the 
alternative models of investment to be estimated. Section 4 introduces the data and 
the stylized facts of our sample. Section 5 discusses the estimation methodology. 
Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Accumulation of fixed assets, liquidity, and financialization  
In the earlier ‘accelerator investment models’ (e.g. Kuh and Meyer, 1955; Evans, 
1967) the capital expenditure was almost entirely explained by expected profitability 
measured by sales. In contrast, the early neoclassical approach modelled the firm's 
investment decision as a static maximization problem of discounted flows of profits 
over an infinite time horizon (Jorgenson, 1963; 1971). As an alternative, investment 
models, based on the maximization of the expected cash flows (or market value) in 
the presence of adjustment costs and expectations, which take the dynamic process 
explicitly into account, have been proposed (Chirinko, 1993). Within this group, the 
so-called ‘Q model’ of Brainard and Tobin (1968), which models investment using the 
Tobin's Q variable, defined as the ratio of the firm’s stock market valuation to its 
capital replacement cost, has been widely used. However, firm-level empirical 
analysis has failed to provide evidence of a strong explanatory power of the Q 
variable (Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Bond et al., 1992). Possible mainstream 
explanations focused on the bias of the stock market evaluation due to asymmetric 
information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and periodic ‘financial bubbles’ (Bond and 
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Cummins, 2001; Bond et al., 2004). But more importantly, as argued by Hubbard 
(1998), the source of financing matter for investment.  
Empirical evidence shows that cash-flows, i.e. internal funds, are important 
determinants of investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Blundell et al., 1992; Brown et al., 
2009). In particular, the seminal contribution by Fazzari et al. (1988) shows that 
fluctuations in internal finance, as reflected by cash-flows, are statistically more 
important than the stock market evaluation in determining the level of accumulation. 
Liquidity constraints play a crucial role in determining investment (Fazzari and 
Petersen, 1993; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995; Kadapakkam et al., 1998)  
In the specific case of the UK, evidence shows that cash flow always has a 
signficant positive effect on accumulation, whilst the effects of the stock market 
evaluation and debt are mixed (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Bond and Meghir, 
1994; Bond et al., 2003; Bloom et al., 2007).    
The mainstream investment literature argues that companies’ financing issues 
mainly derive from agency problems, and the development of financial markets can 
relax these constraints (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Love, 2003; Pawlina and 
Renneboog, 2005; Love and Zicchino, 2006; Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008; Bond et 
al., 2003). Companies’ financial flows are not directly taken into account in these 
analyses. As a result of the transformation of the economies towards a financialized 
stage in the last decades, the mainstream models of investment may be misspecified 
due to their neglect of some important factors in the firms’ financing and investment 
decision.  
 The Post-Keynesian literature offers a more holistic approach to the analysis 
of the effect of financial markets on investment, where NFCs are far from passive 
players under the control of oversized financial markets. In addition to (or even 
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partially substituting) physical investments, NFCs can readily accumulate financial 
assets. The Post-Keynesian literature conceives the firm as a ‘battlefield’ for different 
vested interests (Stockhammer, 2006). The most visible type of internal conflict is 
reflected in shareholders’ preference for short-term profitability, which undermines 
the accumulation of fixed capital (Dallery, 2009; Hein and van Treeck, 2008). There is 
a ‘growth-profit trade-off’ within the managerial decision-making process of firms 
(Lavoie, 1992). The increasing involvement of the NFCs in finance-related activities 
has to be understood primarily as a consequence of a change in the corporate 
governance (Lazonick and O'sullivan, 2000). From the early 1980s onwards, there 
has been a legitimization of the rule of maximizing the ‘shareholder value’ 
(Rappaport, 1999). While the former imperative has been to ‘retain and re-invest’, 
under the shareholder rule, to ‘downsize plants and distribute earnings’ is 
paramount. The management has to please the shareholder’s requests by distributing 
dividends and boosting share prices through share buyback operations (De Ridder, 
2009). Furthermore, financialization offers a fall back option to firms to invest in 
reversible short-term financial assets instead of irreversible long-term fixed assets, 
and thereby financial assets crowd out accumulation. This behavioural twist 
negatively affected the long-term investment plans. 
The vast majority of the empirical literature on the impacts of financialization 
on investment is based on a macroeconomic framework (Stockhammer, 2004; van 
Treek, 2008; Orhangazi, 2008a; Arestis et al., 2012). 
Regarding firm level effect of finance on investment, the seminal paper by 
Fazzari and Mott (1986) models the three key components of the Post-Keynesian 
theory of investment: a positive effect of sales (as a proxy for capacity utilization), a 
positive and independent effect of internal finance, i.e. ‘less expensive’ retained 
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earnings, and a negative impact of interest expenses.4 In particular, they introduce a 
flow measure for interest payments to define a ‘committed constraint’ on the 
available cash flow.  
In another Post-Keynesian microeconomic investment model, Ndikumana 
(1999) finds negative effects of both stock and flows of debt. Firm’s indebtedness not 
only reduces the cash flow (via interest payments), but also affects the sustainability  
of investments.  
However, Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999) do not model the 
impact of financial revenues, which is an important dimension of financialization. To 
the best of our knowledge, there are only two microeconomic papers that analyse the 
effects of financial incomes of NFCs. Orhangazi (2008b) finds a negative effect of 
financial payments and long-term debt on accumulation in the NFCs in the USA, 
whereas the effects of financial incomes on investment depend on the firm size and 
sector, with a significant negative crowding out effect for larger firms, and a positive 
effect for the smaller firms in the non-durables sector, indicating its dual role as a 
source of internal finance. Demir (2009) finds that increasing returns on financial 
assets relative to fixed assets reduced accumulation in the NFCs in Argentina, Mexico, 
and Turkey.  
Building on this literature, in the next section we describe the specifications of 
different models of investment, by comparing a basic model vis-à-vis a full 
specification which takes explicitly into account the effects of financialization 
including both financial incomes and payments. 
 
 
 
9 
 
3. Alternative models of investment  
Within the Post-Keynesian theory capital accumulation is an intrinsically dynamic 
process (Kalecki, 1954; Lopez and Mott, 1998). Physical investment is an irreversible 
phenomenon. There is a path dependency that link past and future levels of 
accumulation, as confirmed by the previous empirical literature (Ford and Poret, 
1991; Kopcke and Brauman, 2001; Orhangazi, 2008b; Arestis et al., 2012). Therefore, 
in all the models to be estimated, we include the lagged investment. Also all other 
explanatory variables are lagged in order to depict the ‘adjustment processes’.  
 To analyse the potential effects of financialization, we start with a basic 
investment model based on Fazzari and Mott (1986). Next, by progressively enriching 
this basic version, we present our final model of ‘financialized investment’. Equation 
(1) presents the basic model, where the rate of accumulation, I/K, is:  
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where I is the gross addition to fixed assets, K is the net capital stock, π is 
operating income, CD are cash dividends, (π-CD) identifies the retained earnings, S is 
net sales, iD is the interest expenses on debt; all variables are normalized by K in 
order to control for firm size.5 i is the firm index. βt identifies a set of time-dummies to 
control for unobservable time-specific effects common to all firms, whilst the 
standard disturbance term εit captures firm-specific fixed effects and idiosyncratic 
shocks. All variables are introduced in first and second lags to reflect the time 
consideration in the investment plans. The retained earnings/fixed assets ratio is a 
measure of the profit rate, the sales/fixed assets ratio is a proxy reflecting capacity 
utilization, whilst interest expenses reflect the firm-level cost of capital. We expect 
10 
 
positive effects of the lagged accumulation rate, retained earnings, and sales on 
investment. In contrast, we expect the impact of interest payments (or ‘cash 
commitments’) to be negative.  
In this basic model cash dividends are conceived as simply a reduction of 
available internal funds. However, in developed financialized capitalist systems the 
distributed dividends may have a further effect, reflecting behavioural changes due to 
the ‘shareholder value orientation’ (henceforth SVO) as suggested by Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000). In addition, as argued by Boyer (2000) among others, financial 
markets and institutions considerably raised the profitability targets imposed on 
management. As a consequence, the spectrum of the investments projects considered 
as sufficiently profitable to be implemented has been reduced. Hence, a considerable 
portion of the available cash flow has been made available for the accumulation of 
financial assets and/or dividend payments. For these reasons, equation (2) 
introduces this further effect of cash dividends payments as a ratio to K (CD/K): 
 
(
𝐼
𝐾
)
𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∑ (
𝐼
𝐾
)
𝑖𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽2 ∑ (
𝜋 − 𝐶𝐷
𝐾
)
𝑖𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽3 ∑ (
𝑆
𝐾
)
𝑖𝑡−𝑗
2
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽4 ∑ (
𝑖𝐷 
𝐾
)
𝑖𝑡−𝑗
+ 𝛽5 ∑ (
𝐶𝐷
𝐾
)
𝑖𝑡−𝑗
+
2
𝑗=1
2
𝑗=1
 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           (2) 
 
In the light of the macroeconomic Post-Keynesian literature, we expect an adverse 
effect of CD/K on investments. We recognize that the rise in dividend payments can 
as also be the consequence of the process of financialization, and deceleration of 
accumulation, and therefore treat this variable as endogenous, as we discuss in more 
detail below in the section on estimation methodology. 
Furthermore, not only do NFCs use part of their funds to pay interest and 
dividend to the financial sector, but they can also more than before pursue non-
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operating financial investment themselves, thus receiving financial incomes. 
Therefore, in equation (3) we include the sum of interests and dividends received by 
the NFCs (πF)  as a ratio to K as an additional variable6: 
(
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Theoretically, the sign of the effect of financial incomes on investment is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, they may have a positive impact on the accumulation of 
fixed assets by easing the liquidity constraint faced by firms. In particular, this can be 
the case for smaller companies, which are more likely to experience liquidity 
restrictions compared to larger corporations. On the other hand, financial activities 
can also be detrimental to physical accumulation, since NFCs will be attracted by 
short-term, reversible financial investment, instead of engaging in long-term, 
irreversible physical investment.   
Finally, equation (4) below presents our general model of financialized 
investment: 
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Here we introduce a composite measure for outward financialization, F, which 
is the sum of interest and dividend payments (as a ratio to K), capturing a) the 
liquidity effect of interest payments, and b) the additional behavioural effect of the 
SVO. In brief, F reflects the financial outflows, while πF  reflects the financial inflows.  
Furthermore, in order to test the different effect of financial payments in small 
vs. large companies, we estimate an extended version of Model (4) as,  
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where the dummy variable DTA25 takes the value 1 if the average total assets of 
company i lies in the lower 25 percentile of the distribution, and takes the value 0 
otherwise. The dummy is interacted with the financial incomes. While β5 is the effect 
of financial incomes in large companies, β5 + β6  capture the effect of financial incomes 
in smaller companies. 
With equations (4) and (4a) we aim at introducing a full model of firm-level 
investment that is coherent with the Post-Keynesian tradition of investment analysis, 
and that a) takes into account the inherent irreversibility of physical investment, b) 
controls for the independent effect of profitability and demand, c) highlights the 
effects of financial relations, d) makes a clear distinction between operating and non-
operating activities, and e) treats financial outflows and inflows, i.e. both outward and 
inward financialization, as fundamental determinants.7  
 
4. Data and stylized facts  
We extracted our data from the Worldscope database of publicly listed firm’s balance 
sheets, which contains standardized accounting information about not only 
investment, sales, profits, interest and dividend payments but also companies’ 
financial incomes. Standardized data on financial payments and, in particular, 
financial incomes are difficult to find; our database allows us to have a 
comprehensive variable for our estimations. Worldscope database has been 
acknowledged as a valuable source in the literature on firm-level investment analysis 
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(e.g. Cleary 1999; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Love, 2003; Love and Zicchino, 
2006).  
 We use data for all active and inactive, publicly listed NFCs in the UK (thus 
excluding financial firms identified by the primary SIC codes from 6000 to 6799).8 
Our data are annual for the period of 1985-2013.9 We found a high correlation 
between our variables and the corresponding macroeconomic data.10 Tables 3A and 
4A in the Appendix provide summary statistics for the total economy and 
manufacturing sector. 
It is well-known that the presence of outliers usually characterizes firm-level 
data. To prevent biased estimations, we apply a data screening process, by excluding 
extreme outlier observations from the sample. First, we select firms that have at least 
three consecutive observations for the dependent variable, which is also required for 
econometric purposes (Roodman, 2009). Second, we drop all the companies with a 
permanent negative mean operating income. Finally, we exclude observations in the 
upper and lower 1% of each variable’s distribution.11  
Next we present the stylized facts of our sample. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
the rate of accumulation of fixed assets in the UK’s NFCs decreased substantially 
during the early 1990s, and has only partially recovered, albeit not back to its peak 
level, with further declines during the Great Recession.   
 
[Figure 2] 
 
Overall, the rate of accumulation has remained stagnant around an average of 
0.25 for the whole period. Compared to the peak in 1988 (0.32), the rate is lower 
(0.26) in 2013. The stagnation in the manufacturing sector (dashed line) is stronger, 
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as investment has not recovered much after the 1990s recession, with the rate of 
accumulation being the same in 2013 as in 1985 (0.22).  
Figure 3 shows the trends in the rate of accumulation and the operating 
income (as a ratio to K). From the start of the recovery in 1992 onwards, the rate of 
accumulation increases along with the operating income; however the rise in 
operating income is stronger with respect to investment. Furthermore, from 2004 on, 
investment stagnates despite an increasing profit rate.12 
 
[Figure 3] 
 
Figure 4 shows the ratio of investment (addition to fixed assets) to operating 
income; i.e. the rate of reinvestment, and the stock of financial assets as a ratio to 
fixed assets. There has been a clear decline of the operating income devoted to the 
enlargement of NFCs’ core activities from 80-90% in the 1980s to 40-50% in the last 
decade. Despite the partial recovery of investments since 1992, the rate of 
reinvestment continued to decline. In sharp contrast, the stock of financial assets 
increased substantially, reaching 90% as a ratio to fixed capital in the late 1980s, and 
a level more than three times the fixed assets before the crisis in 2008. The financial 
crisis in 2008 has led to only a slight fall in the value of the financial assets. As shown 
in figure 5, the substantial involvement in the accumulation of financial assets 
resulted in increasing non-operating income for the NFCs, which again declined 
briefly after the 2007-2008 crisis, and then totally recovered in 2013.13 
[Figure 4]  
[Figure 5] 
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 Finally, Figure 6 shows the financial payments of the NFCs in the form of 
interests on debt and dividends paid to the shareholders, which have increased 
substantially since the mid-1990s. From 1985 to 2008 financial payments (CD + iD) as 
a ratio to total fixed capital increased from 16% in 1985 to 42% in 2008. The financial 
exposition of NFCs entails a significant reduction of internal funds.   After the Great 
Recession interest paid on debt diminishes, whereas dividends paid maintain their 
increasing trend after a brief period of fall.  
 
[Figure 6] 
 
 In conclusion, the stylized facts show a) a stagnant rate of accumulation b) a 
declining rate of reinvestment of operating income c) an increase in the overall 
degree of financialization in terms of financial assets, incomes as well as payments. 
 
5. Estimation methodology  
Equations 1-4 presented in Section 3 are estimated using a dynamic panel-data model 
including two lags of the accumulation rate as explanatory variables. As explained in 
section 3, investment is an intrinsically dynamic phenomenon.  
In dynamic panel data models, the unobserved panel-level effects are 
correlated with the lagged dependent variables. As a consequence, standard 
estimators (e.g. Ordinary or Generalized Least Squares) would be inconsistent. 
Therefore, we estimate our models using a difference-GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). This methodology is suitable for analyses based on a ‘small time/large 
observations’ sample.14 GMM is a powerful estimator for analyses based on firm-level 
data mainly for three reasons (Roodman, 2009). First, GMM is one of the best 
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techniques to control for all sources of endogeneity between the dependent and 
explanatory variables, by using internal instruments, namely the lagged levels of the 
explanatory variables, which allows us to address dual causality, if rising financial 
payments and incomes is also a consequence of the slowdown in the capital 
accumulation. The instrument set consists of instruments that are not correlated with 
the first difference of the error term, but correlated with the variable we are 
estimating. Second, by first-differencing variables, this estimator eliminates 
companies’ unobservable fixed effects. Third, GMM can address autocorrelation 
problems. We apply two tests to assess the appropriateness of the instrument sets, 
and lag structures. First, we check for second-order serial correlation with the 
Arellano-Bond test (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Second, we verify the validity of the 
instruments sets through the Hansen test.15 In all models, the lagged dependent 
variable enters the instrument set as endogenous while all other explanatory 
variables enter as predetermined regressors. Consistently, the instrument sets 
include the second and third lags of the lagged dependent variable, and the first and 
second lags of the other lagged explanatory variables.  We test the joint significance of 
the time dummies using a Wald test. 
All the variables are in logarithmic form to allow for non-linear relationships 
between the dependent and the explanatory variables. Furthermore, the logarithmic 
scale enables us to reduce the disturbances coming from the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.  
Our estimation procedure for each model is based on a ‘general-to-specific’ 
strategy, where we arrive at a model with only significant variables. Robust standard 
errors are calculated through a two-step procedure after a finite-sample correction 
(Windmeijer, 2005).  
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6. Estimation results   
This section presents our estimation results. Column 1 of Table 1 shows the 
estimated coefficients for Model (1). As expected, the lagged level of accumulation, 
sales, and retained earnings have positive effects on investment, while interest 
expenses have a significant negative effect. Our results for the UK are in line with the 
findings of Fazzari and Mott (1986) for the USA.  
 Column 2 shows the results for Model (2). We find a significant negative 
impact of CD reflecting the SVO. Thus, the distribution of dividends not only decreases 
available liquidity but also has a further negative behavioural effect on accumulation.
 Column 3 shows the results for Model (3). Income from the NFCs’ financial 
operations has an adverse effect on accumulation, along with a negative effect of 
interest expenses. Cash dividend payments do have a negative but statistically 
insignificant effect.  
 Finally, Column 4 shows the results for the general model extended with a 
variable reflecting aggregated shareholder/lenders value orientation as in Model 4. In 
addition to the ‘financial puncturing’ due to the external funding (banking sector and 
shareholders), total financial incomes in the form of interests and dividends received 
have a significant and negative impact on physical accumulation as well. Thus, 
financial investment crowds–out physical investment. All other variables have the 
expected signs.  
In column 5 we present an extended version of model 4 including the stock 
market evaluation (Tobin’s Q) to test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of 
this widely used variable in the mainstream literature.16 Tobin’s Q has a statistical 
significant and positive effect, and the estimated signs and even magnitudes of the 
other coefficients remain robust.  
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[Table 1] 
 
 Finally, Column 6 of Table 1 presents the results for Model (4 a), a revised 
version of Model (4) in order to capture the different effect of financial incomes with 
respect to the companies’ sizes. As expected, financial incomes have a significant 
positive effect on physical accumulation in the smaller companies, with an elasticity 
of 0.11. This finding is in line with the microeconomic evidence for the USA 
(Orhangazi, 2008b). The effect of financial incomes in the large companies is still 
negative.  
 Next, we test the robustness of our results. First, we estimate model 4 for the 
pre-crisis period of 1985-2007 only. The Great Recession affected both the real and 
financial sides of the economies. As we have seen in section 5, financial incomes 
experienced a sudden fall in 2008. Column 1 in Table 2 presents the results. The signs 
of the coefficients of both financial incomes and payments are negative also for this 
period. Furthermore, the coefficient of financial incomes is more than double 
compared to that in the full period.  
 Second, we control also for another break in the UK economy, namely the early 
1990s recession, and estimate our model for the period 1992-2007. The results 
reported in Column 2 in Table 2 are similar to the ones based on the estimation for 
the 1985-2007 period. The only main difference is a stronger negative effect of the 
financial payments.  
[Table 2] 
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Third, we estimated our final model using the raw-dataset to check the 
robustness to the inclusion of the outliers for the period of 1985-2013. As can be seen 
in Column 3 of Table 2, the results are robust. 17  
Fourth, we performed a robustness check by excluding the public services, 
transportation, and utilities sectors (primary SIC codes from 4011 to 4971 and 9111) 
with a high degree of governmental involvement, since these companies may behave 
differently. As can be seen in Column 4 of Table 2, our estimation results are again 
robust.  
Next we estimated Model (4) for the manufacturing sector only. Table 3 
presents the results for different periods. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
 We focus on manufacturing companies for two reasons. First, our results are 
better comparable with other findings since a considerable part of the empirical 
analyses about firm-level investment is based on manufacturing. Second, as we have 
seen, the share of the manufacturing sector in the UK economy has decreased sharply 
(Figure 1). It is worthwhile to test if financialization has led to a finance-led 
deindustrialization. The results in Column 1 in Table 3 are similar to the ones for the 
whole NFCs sample. Outward financialization, as well as financial incomes, had 
adverse effects on accumulation also in the manufacturing sector. As before, the 
magnitudes of these adverse impacts increase for both the pre-2007, and the intra-
crises periods (Columns 2 and 3). 
 Finally, we present the economic significance of our estimates in Table 4.18 As 
argued by Ziliak and McCloskey (2008), it is important to address the potential 
20 
 
discrepancy between statistical and substantive significance of the estimated 
elasticities. We thus computed the ‘economic significance’ of our estimates in order to 
provide a more reliable measure about the magnitude of the effects. We compute the 
long-run elasticities by dividing each short-run elasticity by one minus the coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable. Multiplying the long-run coefficient by the actual 
cumulative change in each variable for the estimation period, we get the 
corresponding economic effect.  
 Sales (capacity utilization) have been the main determinant of accumulation 
while retained profits had a lower impact. Financial payments, i.e. outward 
financialization (the composite variable for interest payments and SVO) had a 
substantial negative impact on physical investment. The rate of accumulation would 
have been 8.5% higher without the rise in financial payments. Financial incomes, 
inward financialization, had an adverse effect as well, leading to a decline in the 
accumulation rate by 3.6%. The negative impact of outward financialization during 
the pre-crisis phase (1985-2007) is substantially larger (-11.4%), due to a higher 
long-run coefficient.  
[Table 4] 
 Unsurprisingly, the 2008 crisis has strongly reduced the financial incomes of 
NFCs. The cumulative increase in financial incomes before the financial crisis is much 
higher (1.233) than the increase in the full period (0.751).19 Additionally, the long-run 
elasticity of financial income is stronger in this period (-0.109). Hence, in the pre-
crisis phase financial incomes have had a larger negative impact on accumulation. The 
accumulation rate would have been 13.5% higher without an increase in financial 
incomes.  
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 Also in the manufacturing sector, the sharp rise in financial payments reduced 
the rate of accumulation by 13.5% from 1985 to 2013, and by almost 20% before the 
crisis. The 2008 financial crisis led to a decrease in the financial incomes of 
manufacturing, which in turn had a positive economic impact on the rate of 
accumulation in manufacturing companies by 10.2%. Given the higher elasticities, 
financial payments had the strongest negative economic effects in both time periods. 
7. Conclusion   
This paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of financialization on firm-level 
investment in the publicly listed NFCs in the UK based on a dynamic panel data 
model. Our results show that financialization, depicted as the increasing orientation 
towards external financing, and the internal substitution of fixed accumulation by 
financial activity, had a fundamental role in suppressing investment in the NFCs in the 
UK. This is even more evident in the period before the financial crash, and especially 
for the manufacturing sector. The availabilty of internal funds constraints the 
investment decision. On the one hand, the increase in financial payments for external 
finance and to favor the shareholders (interest and dividends) reduce the NFCs 
internal funds, and thus accumulation. On the other hand, the negative crowding-out 
effects of financial investment on accumulation more than offset the gains from 
relaxing the cash-flow constraint. Financial incomes have a positive effect on 
investment only for the smaller companies.  
In the UK NFCs, the rate of accumulation would have been higher without the 
rise in interest and dividend payments as well as financial incomes. The negative 
effects of financialization have been stronger in the pre-crisis period. The physical 
accumulation in manufacturing sector suffered even more experiencing a finance-led 
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deindustrialisation. In particular, for the pre-crisis period in manufacturing we find 
that the adverse effects of financial payments and financial incomes almost entirely 
offset the positive impacts due to increasing sales and retained profits. It is important 
to stress that these results are based on the specific sample of publicly listed 
companies.  
These results for the UK provide support to the theoretical arguments 
regarding the negative effects of financialization and confirm previous empirical 
findings at the macro and microeconomic levels for other countries. In particular, 
although not fully comparable, our results confirm previous findings at the 
microeconomic level for the USA (Orhangazi, 2008b), as well as at the 
macroeconomic level for the USA and European countries (see in particular 
Stockhammer, 2004 and van Treeck, 2008). 
The increasing interrelations between the financial markets and the NFCs are 
progressively reducing fixed capital accumulation, and thus growth. These results 
contrast with the mainstream arguments regarding the beneficial effects of financial 
deepening.  
To reach a stable and vigorous dynamic of investment, a de-financialization of 
the non-financial sector is desirable. This requires an extended regulation of 
companies’ non-operating financial activities along with financial regulation. The 
robust connection between past and present levels of accumulation increases the 
potential effectiveness of de-financialization economic policies. 
Clearly our analysis does not exhaust the need for a deeper analysis about 
financialization of the NFCs, and further research is needed to assess the multifaceted 
feature of this phenomenon. In particular, the investigations of the determinants of 
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companies’ ‘financial accumulation’, as well as the sources of businesses’ financial 
assets are important questions for future research.  
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Figures and Tables  
 
Figure1. Value added in the financial and manufacturing sectors as a ratio to total 
value added in the UK (%) 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Rate of accumulation (I/K) in NFCs in all sectors and in Manufacturing in 
the UK  
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Figure 3. Rate of accumulation (I/K) and operating income (π/K) in NFCs, the UK  
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Investment/Operating income (I/π), and financial assets/fixed assets (FA/K) 
in NFCs, the UK     
 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Figure 5. Investment/Operating income (I/π), and non-operating income (𝝅𝑭/K) in 
NFCs, the UK 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Cash dividends/fixed assets (CD/K), and interest paid on debt (iD/K) in the 
NFCs, the UK  
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Table 1. Estimation results based on Models (1), (2), (3), and (4); dependent variable (I/K)t ; Estimation period 1985-2013 
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Table 2. Estimation results based on Model (4) for different time periods, sectors, and 
sample; dependent variable (I/K)t  
 
 
Table 3. Estimation results based on Model (4) for the manufacturing sector; 
dependent variable (I/K)t  
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Table 4. Economic effects based on estimation results in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 
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Appendices  
 
Table 1A. Variables definition and codes. 
 
 
Table 2A. Correlations between ONS macroeconomic data  
and Worldscope sample data.  
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Table 3A. Summary statistics, NFCs, the UK; all sectors 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
N = number of total observations, n= number of groups, T-bar = average time period  
 
 
 
 
Table 4A. Summary statistics, NFCs, the UK; manufacturing sector 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
N = number of total observations, n= number of groups, T-bar = average time period  
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Endnotes   
                                                          
1  According to Van der Zwan (2014:114) “Corporate governance reform often came slightly later and 
partially as a response to financial market liberalization. The UK was an early mover, where shareholder-
oriented corporate governance institutions were developed both through law and self-regulatory codes 
regarding the structure and duties of boards. Other countries followed with measures to strengthen 
shareholder rights and deregulate the use of corporate equity.” 
2 According to Lapavitsas and Powell (2013:375) “the evidence indicated that, in all countries, nonfinancial 
corporations have become less reliant on banks and have increased their acquisition of financial assets. 
However, there is variation in the trend, Japanese and German lagging behind US and UK enterprises.”  
3 In contrast, some authors of the Marxian tradition (e.g. Lapavitsas, 2009; Kliman and Williams, 2014) 
argue for a reversed causality, i.e. financialization of the economy should be understood as a consequence, 
and not as a cause of the slowdown in the capital accumulation. 
4 The paper provides a response to the mainstream critiques of the use of liquidity measures to model 
investment by Jorgenson (1971). 
5 Variables definitions are in Appendix Table1A. In our version of the model by Fazzari and Mott (1986) we 
add the lagged rate of accumulation as an additional explanatory variable. Secondly, we do not need  a 
variable for the gross plant value, since we already control for the companies’ size by scaling each variable 
as a ratio to fixed capital. 
6 Following the agreed accounting definition, ‘non-operating income’ is the portion of an organization's 
income that is derived from activities not related to its core operations. This type of income usually consists 
of dividend income, profits and losses from investments and currency exchange rate dynamics, plus other 
non-operating revenues. As shown in Table 1A in the appendix, the two variables that constitute the 
aggregate financial profit are dividends and interests received by the company. This is also consistent with 
the way aggregate financial payments are defined. Interest and dividends do not exhaust the spectrum of non-
operating financial incomes of NFCs. In fact Krippner (2005) shows how capital gains account for a 
considerable part of NFCs financial profits. However, as recognised by Orhangazi (2008b) with respect to 
Compustat database, also in Worldscope data on capital gains are not available.   
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7 We also extended the model with total debt/fixed capital, and change in or the square of this ratio, but we 
did not find any statistically significant effects. Results are available upon request. An extended model with 
share buybacks was not feasible due to lack of data.  In fact, Worldscope does not provide sufficient number 
of observations about companies’ share buybacks in the UK. The inclusion of this variable would have 
caused a considerable reduction in our sample, in terms of both the number of firms and the time period. In 
addition to this technical reason, we believe that the process of share buybacks could be viewed also 
as a method for the financial managers of the firms to modify the capital structure of the organization 
and not always as a way to artificially raise the price of the share. 
8 Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code, 1994 version.  
9 The choice of the time-period is due to data availability. 
10 We compare our sample with data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in Appendix Table2A. 
Macro data for detailed variables are available only for 1997-2013. ONS does not provide a disaggregation 
for publicly listed and private companies. 
11 We follow Chirinko et al. (1999) and Orhangazi (2008b) for defining the outliers. Our estimations are 
robust to the inclusion of the outliers.   
12 The ratio of operating income to K appears to be rather high. This is because physical assets (K) are only 
32.8% of total assets including financial assets on average over the whole period and all firms. Total 
operating and non-operating income as a ratio to total assets would be 10.3% on average.   
13 Milberg and Winkler (2009) argue that the accumulation-financialization link is blurred by the increase in 
off-shoring. This is not a problem in our case, since all our data are provided on a consolidated basis (parent 
company plus subsidiaries). Moreover, the non-operating dividend incomes come from  financial activities.  
14 The full period is 29 years, but the average period for which all the variables are available is 6-9 years. 
15  Hansen test takes the orthogonality between instruments and regressions’ residuals as the indicator of 
consistency between estimated and sample moments. We tested and confirmed the presence of 
heteroskedasticity in our sample by using the White/Koenker and the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-
Weisberg tests. Hansen’s-J test is preferred to the Sargan test in the presence of heteroskedasticity 
(Roodman, 2009). However, the Hansen test (as the Sargan test) is sensitive to the total number of 
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instruments. Therefore, we use only the first and second lags of our variables as instruments. Furthermore, 
all instruments are ‘collapsed’, thus having an instrument for each variable and lag distance. 
16 We use the approximate average measure for Tobin’s Q suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994:71), who 
define it as a compromise between “analytical precision and computational effort” based on the well-
established procedure by Lindenberg and Ross (1981). Tobin’s Q is treated as endogenous based on the 
Hansen-test. 
17 Furthermore, we checked the robustness of our results by excluding firms with a logarithmic change in 
sales higher than 1 (only 5 firms excluded). The estimated coefficients are robust.   
18 The economic effects for 1992-2007 are very similar to the 1985-2007. Results are available upon request.  
19 The actual change of financial incomes is positive even if we take into account the crisis. This is due to the 
recovery of interest and dividends incomes since 2009.  
